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Abstract 
The shipbuilding is a technology intensive sector and it requires a long production 
process. Hence, it needs a financial leverage and it depends on economic policy decision. 
This work aims to reveal the footprints of the crisis and the variables with the most 
influence on the industry’s results. For that purpose we obtained a sample of companies 
from the SABI database, constructed financial ratios and analysed them for statistically 
significant changes by testing hypotheses with a 95% confidence level. In addition, 
statistical regression was used to find the economic variables that best explain the 
evolution of income in the set of firms and they are Ministry of Defence and business re-
investment costs.   
Key words: Shipbuilding Industry, Financial Crisis, Public Budget, Financial Autonomy, 
Yield, Business Survival.  
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1. Introduction 
The shipbuilding industry is crucially important in many countries because, as López and 
Fariña (2012) and Guisado, Vila and Ferro (2002) point out, it is fully globalised and 
therefore very dynamic with a major technological component.  In addition, as Suaz 
(2012), Cerezo (2005), Marjolein C. J. Caniëls, Eugène Cleophas and Janjaap Semeijn 
(2016) explain, because it manufactures a singular product with high unit value and long 
construction period, it is not only exposed to fluctuations in the economic cycle and 
international competition, but also to national economic policy decisions.  
Furthermore, the Spanish shipbuilding industry is a synthesis industry: the shipyards 
subcontract part of their production to the auxiliary industry thus driving the economy 
and jobs in the area where they are located.  As a result, Novoa and Carneros (2012) 
argue that the sector requires special support from public authorities.   
The international financial crisis that reached Spain in 2008 caused financial margins to 
plummet and cut off access to credit with the consequent collapse in the productive 
economy as noted in Fuente and Velasco (2015); Grau and Reig (2014); Małgorzata and 
Marek (2013); Rojas and López (2013) and Martin (2011). The situation obviously had a 
knock on effect on the balance sheets and results of businesses in general and 
shipbuilding in particular. Our objective therefore, is to contribute towards clarifying how 
Spanish shipyards survived the crisis by analysing the evolution of their Financial 
Statements.   
Although the crisis reached Spain in the second quarter of 2008 and worsened in 2010 as 
a consequence of the sovereign debt crisis, as Ortega and Peñasola (2012) and Rojas and 
López (2013) show, contraction of the international economy from 2007 must have been 
affecting the economic and financial results of Spanish shipyards because, following 
Freire, González and País (2012), during the years of economic recession the reduction in 
international trade and shipping generated excess available capacity in shipping lines. 
These activities are closely related to shipbuilding and so there was a gradual downturn in 
orders placed with shipyards.  
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Furthermore, as Cuerpo and Ramos (2015), Laborda and Fernández (2012) and Metcalfe 
(2012) point out, the enactment in 2010 of Spain’s Law on Budgetary Stability (LEP) 
which sought to contain public spending and the European Commission’s decision to 
declare Spain’s “Tax lease” illegal must have had an even greater impact on the evolution 
of the Annual Accounts and Results of Spanish shipyards.  
The shipbuilding industry has been studied by authors such as Suaz (2012), Cerezo 
(2005) and López and Fariña (2012) who describe the situation and prospects of Spanish 
shipyards in recent years. Other authors like Guisado et al. (2002) and Valdaliso (2003) 
analyse the effects of previous crises on shipyards in Galicia and the Basque Country 
respectively. More recent works include Marjolein et al. (2016) who analyse drivers for 
supply chain participation of suppliers in the shipbuilding industry or García-Canal 
(2016) establishing the significance of technological and relational risk applied to the 
evolution of a specific shipyard; the study by Pérez de Guzmán (2012) which investigates 
the power of collective bargaining over policy decisions in Cadiz shipyards; and the study 
by Novoa and Carneros (2012) which examines R+D+i as one of the sector’s strategies 
for overcoming the crisis and ensuring future viability.  
Other authors, like Azofra and Rodriguez (2012); Rojas and López (2103); Maudos 
(2013) and Małgorzata and Marek (2013) have studied the effects of the crisis and credit 
restrictions on Spanish businesses. There are also studies that establish the evolution of an 
industry before the crisis or seek the reasons for its collapse, like those by  González and 
Jareño (2014); Ramón-Dangla (2016a, 2016b) and Lado-Sestayo, Otero-González, Vivel-
Bua and Martorell-Cunill (2016) focusing on the hotel industry, commerce and 
commercial distribution respectively and the study by Akin et al. (2014), Roig and 
Soriano (2015) or Botzem and Dobusch (2017) which examines the construction and real 
estate industries in Spain and in Europe. But no study has analysed the effects of the crisis 
in the shipbuilding industry by analysing shipyard annual accounts. Our aim therefore is 
to analyse financial information from the surviving firms to describe how and why they 
survived the crisis.  
Financial information from businesses is essential for deciphering the consequences for 
firms of different economic measures and contexts as Sánchez (2002); Godoy (2004) and 
Gonzalo, Pérez and Serrano (2000) have already described. For example, according to 
Amat (2000) and Gonzalo et al. (2000), analysis of financial statements facilitates 
economic and financial decision-making by third parties, and ratios produced through 
coefficients are extremely useful in this task. Our work is divided into this first 
introductory section. The second section is a review of the literature on the main 
economic aspects of study which are the starting point for this research and the 
formulation of our hypotheses. The third section explains the variables used and the 
methodology for achieving the proposed aims. The fourth section provides an analysis of 
the results and a final point presents the conclusions, including a discussion of the results, 
the limitations of the study and future research lines.  
 
2. Shipbuilding industry and financial crisis. hypotheses   
A financial crisis will affect yields, solvency and business efficiency to a greater or lesser 
extent.  Shipyards, however, may be even more vulnerable because the industry is very 
globalised and given that a large part of its production is for export (Table 1) other 
international political and economic factors may also affect their evolution. In the late 
20th Century, aggressive commercial and pricing policies in some countries, bordering on 
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unfair competition as López-Quiroga (2002), Suaz (2012), and Guisado et al. (2002) 
emphasise, caused shipbuilding orders to shift to Asian countries and Korea in particular.  
 
Table 1: Percentage weight of exports over total new CGT1 per year 
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
0.49 0.76 0.64 0.97 0.93 0.91 0.92 0.87 0.94 0.43 
Source: Gerencia del Sector Naval. Own elaboration 
 
Furthermore, as shipbuilding is an industry where public and private shipyards coexist 
and they produce a custom-made, technology-intensive product with a high unit value, 
requiring a lengthy construction period, they are very exposed to national economic 
policy decisions as Cerezo (2005), Pérez de Guzmán (2012), Guisado et al. (2002) point 
out. Thus, when the European Commission began proceedings in 2011 on the system of 
tax credits that declared the Spanish “Tax Lease” illegal and the possibility of having to 
return almost 3,000 million euros, the demand for private ships fell and was aggravated 
by national policy decisions which eliminated the demand for public ships (Table 2). The 
entry into force of the Law on Budgetary Stability (2010) as Cuerpo and Ramos (2015), 
Laborda and Fenández (2012) and Metcalfe (2012) explain, restricted public spending 
and investment in all projects causing ship orders from the Spanish Ministry of Defence 
and the Spanish Navy to disappear.  
 
Table 2: Evolution of weighted production in the sector (CGT)  
 
2003 2006 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
Public 
149,76 0 10,528 10,528 10,528 0 0 0 5,60 41,547 
Private 
250,96 294,96 393,07 351,10 236,63 175,42 106,92 160,93 148,09 137,90 
Total 
400,72 294,96 403,60 361,63 247,16 175,42 106,92 160,93 153,69 179,44 
Source: Gerencia del Sector Naval 
 
After 2007 the drop in Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in most countries caused major 
downturns in international trade and freight which led to overcapacity in the international 
merchant fleet and a readjustment in the demand for new ships. However, production in 
private Spanish shipyards did not begin to contract until 2009, when the crisis was well 
advanced even in Spain and only after 2011 did it collapse, coinciding with the 
declaration that Spain’s “Tax Lease” was illegal.  
Production in public shipyards evolved in the same way. The policies introduced to 
contain spending from 2010 eliminated the demand for ships from the Spanish Ministry 
of Defence, and made 2012 the worst year for the shipbuilding industry. Although the 
new century had begun with considerable weighted production which continued even 
after the start of the crisis, from 2009 and until 2012 production in private shipyards 
                                                          
1CGT (Compensated Gross Tonnage) is the unit for measuring shipyard production determined by 
the OECD Compensated Gross Tonnage (CGT). It relates the amount of work required to build a 
ship and the size, expressed by GT (Gross Tonnage) and a degree of sophistication is introduced 
by using a coefficient that grows with the complexity of the type of ship.   
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gradually fell to 70% of what it had been in 2008 and production in public shipyards 
disappeared.  
The shipbuilding industry is a strategic industry from the political and economic point of 
view as in 2014 it provided 44,273 jobs of which 16% were direct jobs and 84% were in 
the auxiliary industry. Shipbuilding contributed more than 1% to Spain’s Industrial 
Production Index (IPI) and in the ranking of Spain's industrial sectors it has always been 
among the top 25 out of more than 100. In addition, as the both the employers’ 
association of small and medium shipyards (Pymar) and the workers’ union, CC.OO, 
agree, the ability for the sector to maintain a competitive, technologically advanced 
offering tailored to customer needs has enabled Spanish shipyards to be the only ones to 
offer tailor-made production. Spanish shipyards stand out in international markets for 
their ability to design and build different types of multi-functional ships.  
By becoming a synthesis industry where the shipyard coordinates a global project, 
building the hull of the ship and integrating other components supplied by the auxiliary 
industry, the shipbuilding industry has managed to maintain high production quality and 
extended its prospects of survival. However, the fact of not shrinking production when 
the international crisis began in 2007 and not increasing it after 2013 when the 
international recovery began suggests that the sector is highly influenced by variables that 
do not strictly concern developments in the economy. Therefore:  
H1: Political and economic variables condition the evolution of the shipbuilding industry 
more than the economic situation.  
The peculiarities of the shipbuilding industry make it highly dependent on outside credit 
and therefore very exposed to credit markets. In this regard, studies like those of Jordà, 
Schularik and Taylor (2011) show that corporate debt is closely linked to the evolution of 
macroeconomic variables, with a clear relationship between financial leverage and the 
economic situation even the bankruptcy as explain Succurro and Mannarino (2014). On 
the other hand, Shobha S (2011) conclude for the shipbuilding industry that the home 
region of a firm and prior acquisition experience increases the probability of acquisitions 
of a company while prior partnership experience decreases it but the level of synergy and 
degree of market uncertainty do not affect the mode of alliance choice between partner or 
acquire.  
However, according to Rajan and Zingales (1995); Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic 
(1999); Booth, Aivazian, Dermirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic (2001); Hanousek and 
Shamshur (2011) or Faulconbridge and Muzio (2009), companies’ debt preferences are 
determined by their specific characteristics and the peculiarities of the country or as Gill 
de Albornoz and Giner (2013) indicate, by the type of sector where they operate.  Thus 
Rubio and Sogorb (2011) conclude that Spanish companies moved quickly towards 
objective debt ratios during downswings in the economic cycle: the credit squeeze and 
rising cost of credit meant that firms with previously high debt levels tried to deleverage. 
The low returns on revenue made loan repayments difficult and evidenced excessive 
indebtedness which led to a continuous restructuring of corporate liabilities. More recent 
studies like the one by Fuente and Velasco (2015) conclude that in the case of Spain’s 
listed companies, financial restrictions increased agency costs of internal capital markets 
above the benefits offered, thereby negatively affecting firms’ values and Carbó-Valverde 
et al. (2017) affirm that the rise in the interest rate causes divergence in the cost of trade 
credit among firms in the same industrial sector or Clemente-Almendros and Sogorb-
Mira (2016) show the importance of tax benefits of debt for Spanish firms. According to 
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Lorain, García and Sastre (2015) there were increasingly frequent differences between the 
anticipated results of Spanish firms’ financial deleveraging and what actually happened. 
Therefore:  
H2: Although the peculiarities of the shipbuilding industry mean it has major financial 
needs, the crisis forced it to change its financial structure towards greater autonomy.  
 
3. Description of variables, sample and methodology.   
The aim of this work is to examine, through the financial statements of Spanish 
shipyards, the footprint of the crisis in companies in the sector comparing survivors with 
non-survivors and whether changes occurred at the same rate as developments in the 
national economy and international maritime trade.  
The study uses data from companies with the Spanish Economic Activity Code for 
Shipbuilding (CNAE2009-Rev2 (301)) from the SABI (Iberian Balance Sheet Analysis 
System) database for 2006-2015.  
The initial population was 513 companies but we eliminated all the companies that did 
not present financial information in a consistent manner. That is, we eliminated firms 
whose accounting information was inconsistent and whose assets could not be reconciled. 
Thus 340 firms remained in the purged sample, the size of which was found to be 
representative of the original population with 95% certainty, a 3% margin of error and an 
expected proportion of 50%.  
Then the companies were classified according to whether they survived the crisis or not 
and were created before the crisis began or not, which gave 4 subgroups of companies: 
those which survived the crisis having been created before it began are denominated 
“Generation 2006-15” (127 firms).  Those which were created during the crisis and 
managed to survive: “Generation Crisis-2015” (48 firms). Those which existed before the 
crisis but did not survive: “Generation 2006-Disappeared” (214 firms) and those which 
were created and disappeared during the crisis “Fleeting Generation” (23 firms). 
Then for the analysis the set of financial ratios for measuring key economic dimensions in 
a firm’s activity were defined following Foster (1986); Rivero (1996), Gonzalo et al. 
(2000), Garrido and Íñiguez (2012), Archel et al. (2008) Amat (2000), Esteo (1998) that 
is,  a firm's economic structure, yield, financial leverage, solvency, liquidity and 
operativeness or efficiency. (Table 3).  Then we produced a dashboard and compared the 
average value of the study ratios using one-way and multivariate analysis of variance. 
As the empirical analysis must not simultaneously incorporate all the economic ratios due 
to problems of specification, multicolinearity and data redundancy, following authors like 
Lev (1969:7), Lee and Wu (1988:2), Peles and Schneller (1989:62) and Gallizo and 
Salvador (1997:14) ratios with a high correlation with each other were rejected: Pearson’s 
correlation coefficient above 50% and which like Altmant (1968:23), did not comply with 
the normality and homogeneity of the variances. Thus the ratios chosen for the empirical 
analysis are ROA, ROE, GR, IN, EE1, CR, O2 and O3 
Then we checked for changes in sample averages for each of the ratios chosen for each 
generation of firms using bilateral hypothesis testing for a confidence interval of 95%. 
The F statistic and p-value in the Anova test were used to test the null hypothesis of 
equality of averages for each group of ratios in the study period. Then Tukey’s range test 
or two factor Manova was applied to our groups of variables to see whether in cases 
where the null hypothesis of equality of resources was rejected all the pairs of averages 
are affected or just one of them. The findings suggest that firms were surviving the crisis 
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with small yields and slow changes in their economic and financial structures, especially 
in the oldest surviving generation: “Generation 2006 -15”.  
 
Table 3: Definition of variables 
Factor Variable  Definition 
Yield Yield 1 (R1) Operating Result/Total Assets 
Operating Margin 
(MEX) 
Operating Result/Net Revenues 
Return on Equity 
(ROE) 
Year’s Result / Net Worth 
Return on Assets 
(ROA) 
Result before Tax and Interest / Total Assets 
Solvency Guarantee Ratio 
(GR) 
Total Assets/Total Liabilities 
Solvency 1 (S1) Non-current Liabilities/ Total Assets 
Solvency 2 (S2) Current Liabilities/Total Assets 
Financial 
equilibrium 
Indebtedness (IN) Total Liabilities/Net Worth 
Equilibrium 1 (EQ1) Net Worth/Non-current Assets 
Equilibrium 2 (EQ2) Non-current Assets/Non-current Liabilities 
Economic 
Structure 
Economic Structure 1 
(EE1) 
Non-current Assets/ Total Assets 
Treasury (T) Treasury/Total Assets 
Liquidity Current Ratio (CR) Current Assets/Current Liabilities 




O1 (Current Assets-Current Liabilities)/Net 
Revenues 
O2 Net Revenues/Total Assets 
O3 Staffing Costs/Net Revenues 
Source: Own elaboration 
 
In addition, and to check the relationship and dependency of the oldest surviving 
companies (“Generation 2006-15”) with other macroeconomic variables, we built a 
dependency model based on Multiple Linear Regressions (MLR) (1). The MLR model 
was chosen not only because of its broad application to describe and predict the 
behaviour of a quantitative variable on the basis of the values of other explanatory 
variables but also because of the availability of data. 
Where the dependent variable: NRi is the average Net Revenue of firms in the 
shipbuilding industry in “Generation 2006-15” for each year i.   
NRi is regarded as dependent because it is a key variable in the profit and loss account 
and indicates the progress of a firm’s turnover as it comprises product sales or service 
provision amounts corresponding to ordinary activities, after deducting discounts and 
other reductions on sales, as well as value added tax and other taxes directly related to the 
turnover.   
NRi=α+β1GDPpmi+β2NCAi+ β3(Defensa)i+ β4(TMI)i+ε          (1) 
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GDPpmi is Gross Domestic Product at market prices for year i 
NCAi is average Non-Current Assets for our group of companies for each year i. NCA is 
regarded as the variable that can approximate the amount of investment in capital goods 
because intangible assets have a big impact on NCA in this type of firm. 
Defensai is Ministry of Defence spending on projects for the Navy, included in Chapter 
6.5 of the expenditure budget.  
TMIi is International Maritime Traffic measured through loaded tonnes of all types of 
goods for each year.  
Each β represents the relative significance of each variable in explaining Net Revenue 
with a 95% confidence interval. 
ε is random perturbation. 
The method used to approximate the model (MLR) was the “backward” method. All the 
variables in the equation are introduced in the model and then extracted one after the 
other as long as they satisfy the elimination criterion of low partial correlation with the 
dependent variable. The model was developed by SPSS21 after finding that hypotheses of 
normality of the error term and linearity of the response variable were fulfilled compared 
to predictive variables and that the model offered a high explanatory power represented 
by an “R-squared” and “corrected R-Squared” close to 1. From the linear regression fit 
we were able to approximate the macro-magnitudes with the greatest impact on the 
evolution of Net Revenue in the Spanish shipbuilding industry.  
4. Results 
The statistics suggest two basic ideas. One, the firms that overcame the crisis did so with 
very small, but never negative yields and as soon as the yield became negative, the firm 
disappeared.  Two, the degree of indebtedness in the set of companies was very high, 
especially in the case of surviving firms created during the crisis. Nevertheless, during the 
crisis, the two surviving groups of firms made efforts to reduce their degree of leverage 
with the youngest firms making the most effort. 
The Anova analysis results used to verify whether the average of each ratio differed 
significantly or not throughout the crisis. We rejected the null hypothesis of equality of 
resources with a 95% confidence interval in all the ratios which achieved a p-value<0.05. 
This was corroborated by the Manova analysis which compared the value of each ratio 
every two years to check whether the cases where the null hypothesis of equality of 
resources was rejected affected all the pairs of years or only some.  
The F statistic and the p-value given by the Anova analysis show that the business 
generations created before the crisis have more ratios with statistically significant 
changes. That finding is in complete contrast to what happens with the fleeting generation 
of businesses, their few years of life did not allow them to make many changes either. 
They were created at a difficult time, when orders were falling and with inflexible 
economic and financial structures which prevented them from overcoming the economic 
situation.   
Among the firms that survived the crisis, the oldest: “Generation 2006-15” are the only 
ones that maintained small but positive economic yields (ROA) throughout the period. 
The youngest survivors have supported slightly negative values. Length of time in the 
business is an advantage that may have allowed the oldest companies to benefit from 
better positioning in the markets, in contrast, the young firms were learning to restructure 
to survive. Hence we can surmise that their profitability will grow, especially taking into 
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account that the Financial Yield (ROE) has already begun to do so, and although between 
2010 and 2013 sales and yields did not take off, from 2014 the increase in ship building 
contracts will make2  them grow. 
The Financial Equilibrium ratios indicate that the sector began the crisis with high levels 
of debt but closure of the financial markets and the credit crunch caused the ratio of 
indebtedness (IN) to fall in all surviving companies, and especially in the new companies 
where the ratio shows statistically significant changes. The new companies were created 
with high levels of debt, well above those of the oldest companies, but they evolved 
towards more autonomous positions in a very short time. Deleverage happened so fast 
that when economic recovery began, their indebtedness values are very similar to those of 
the oldest companies. Replacing short term debt with Equity in both groups of surviving 
companies suggests that although the sector is a major demander of credit due to its 
activity, the crisis has made firms reorganise their debt towards more stable and more 
autonomous positions. The Economic Structure of our study companies does not appear 
to have varied significantly during the crisis. The proportion of Non-current Assets in 
relation to the total amount of investments is around 30% without variations for all the 
surviving firms. However, the descriptive statistics point to a slight increase in the case of 
the oldest companies which takes them to around 40% Having smaller levels of debt and 
smaller but positive yields has enabled them to reinvest profits in recent years.  The 
relationship between Net Revenue and Total Assets expressed by O2 supports that 
finding: generation 2006-15 firms are renewing their assets.  
The liquidity ratios (CR) show that there have only been significant changes in the firms 
that went under during the crisis: the negative, decreasing yields during the economic 
crisis limited their ability to pay off their short-term debts which may have triggered the 
disappearance of these firms. 
Table 4 shows the ability of some macro-magnitudes and investment in Non-current 
Assets to explain the evolution in Net Revenues (NR) in the regression model.  At the end 
of the variable selection process, International Maritime Traffic (TMI) and GDP were 
excluded as explanatory factors of the model as their significance levels were above 0.05. 
In contrast, Non-current assets (NCA) and Ministry of Defence spending on the Spanish 
Navy did show a capacity to influence (Sig<0.05).   
Model 3 is the model that best explains the evolution of Net Revenues in shipbuilding 
firms and in addition, is more consistent in offering a significance for zero regression. 
Mathematically, it would be expressed by (2).  
 
NRi=α+β2ANCi+ β3(Defensa)i+ε                                            (2) 
 
Substituting β values gives (3) 
 
NRi=α+0,68ANCi+0,49(Defensa)+ ε                                               (3) 
 
 
                                                          
2During 2014, Spanish shipyards signed 24 new contracts and in 2015, a further 44. Gerencia del 
Sector Naval. 
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Table 4: Weight of macro-magnitudes on the evolution of Net Revenue 











Regression 0.01   
0.94 0.89 
Constant    
ANCi  0.66 0.44 
GDPpm  0.06 0.83 
DEFENSA  1.69 0.15 
TMI  0.12 0.90 
2 
Regression 0.00   
0.93 0.89 
Constant    
ANC  0.56 0.04 
GDP  0.06 0.81 
DEFENSA  0.55 0.11 
3 
Regression 0.00   
0.93 0.89 Constant    ANC  0.68 0.00 
DEFENSA  0.49 0.01 
           Source: own elaboration 
Variations in revenue in the shipbuilding industry are explained by variations in the same 
direction as their Non-current assets (NCA) and Ministry of Defence spending on the 
Navy. Thus, keeping everything else constant, variations in one unit in NCA would cause 
0.68 times variations in the same direction in Net Revenue and if the budget for Ministry 
of Defence spending on the Navy varies by one unit, sales in the sector would increase 
0.49 times.  
Hence the reductions in Spain’s GDP and even in International Maritime Traffic during 
the crisis did not drag turnover in the shipbuilding with them in the same proportion. 
What is more, Net Revenues grew until 2009 when Spain’s GDP and international trade 
were in recession and did not take off again until 2013 when the economy reawakened  
If the reduction in International trade and GDP were not sufficient stimuli to reduce sales 
in the industry until 2009 it must be because other types of orders maintained turnover. 
However, between 2010 and 2013, when the economy started to recover, Spanish 
shipbuilding collapsed: the introduction of the spending contention policies in 2011 
eliminated the demand for ships from Spain’s Ministry of Defence, which together with 
the European Commission’s decision in 2011 to declare the Spanish “Tax lease” illegal 
were the variables that cut off business in the sector. In 2012 the volume of orders in 
private Spanish shipyards was almost a third of what it had been in 2008 and only in 2013 
when the Ministry of Defence began to place new orders and European justice declared 
the “tax lease” in the Spanish shipbuilding sector legal did sales improve.  This finding 
reinforces the idea that evolution in the sector is determined more by political and 
economic variables than by the economic situation.  
 
5. Conclusions  
The aim of this work was to find the footprint of the crisis in Spain’s shipbuilding 
industry through the analysis of financial statements and to find out whether the evolution 
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of the sector is influenced by variables other than the economy itself. The study has found 
significant changes during the crisis only in some ratios, in particular those concerning 
the yield and indebtedness of the companies that survived the crisis.   
The 2007 international financial crisis drastically lowered yields on assets in all the 
business generations, but the oldest generation: “Generation 2006-15” never reached 
negative ROA: their age acted as an advantage and enabled this set of companies to 
benefit from better positioning in the markets. In contrast, the generations that 
disappeared during the crisis experienced negative yields which got worse the longer they 
tried to survive.  
Sales were contracting while operating costs remained almost invariable, thereby 
reducing yields. The lack of orders damaged liquidity and 214 shipbuilding firms created 
before the crisis were unable to repay their creditors and disappeared.  
Nevertheless, the survival of 127 firms created before the crisis “Generation 2006-15” 
and another 48 created during the crisis “Generation crisis-15” is a ground for optimism 
over the industry’s future, especially as both groups have evolved towards more stable 
and more autonomous financial equilibrium positions. As we have seen, levels of debt in 
the sector were high at the start of the crisis but as it progressed the indebtedness ratio 
(IN) fell in the two surviving generations and especially in the youngest companies where 
the ratio shows statistically significant changes. “Generation Crisis-15” was created with 
high levels of debt, well above those of the oldest companies, but evolved towards much 
more autonomous positions in a very short time and thus entered the period of economic 
recovery with indebtedness values similar to those of “Generation 2006-15”.  
The replacement of external debts with Equity in both groups of surviving firms suggests 
that although the sector is a major demander of credit, it made efforts to delever during 
the crisis and the new composition of the debt has made the surviving companies less 
dependent on external credit.  
In terms of economic structure, the surviving companies have not experienced significant 
changes in either the composition of their assets or their degree of liquidity. The weight 
of Non-current Assets which includes the industry’s investment in renewal is above 30% 
of total investment during the entire period. However, firms in “Generation 2006-15” 
have been increasing the weight of Non-current Assets in recent years: their smaller 
levels of debt and smaller but positive yields enable them to reinvest the profits of recent 
years and they may already be renewing assets to make the most of the new economic 
environment. Therefore our second hypothesis H2: Although the peculiarities of the 
shipbuilding industry mean it has major financial needs, the crisis forced it to change its 
financial structure towards greater autonomy is accepted.  
We have also seen the relationship of sales with Non-current Assets and macroeconomic 
variables like GDPmp, Ministry of Defence spending on the Navy and the evolution of 
International Maritime Trade. From this perspective, whereas the economy and 
International Maritime Trade collapsed between 2007 and 2009, Net Revenue fell less 
sharply, suggesting that the industry did not depend strictly on the evolution of the 
economy. This finding was clarified with a Multiple Linear Regression model where the 
macro-magnitudes with the most impact on revenue in the sector were Ministry of 
Defence spending on the Navy with a multiplier coefficient of β3=0.49 and investments 
in Non-current Assets with a multiplier coefficient of β2=0.68. The confidence interval is 
95%.  
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The shipbuilding industry’s lower dependency on evolution of Spain’s GDP and 
International Maritime Trade together with the positive multiplier coefficients of Non-
current assets and Ministry of Defence spending on the Navy support the idea that the 
industry is more dependent on government decisions and business reinvestment policy 
than on the economic situation, and so H1: Political and economic variables condition 
the evolution of the shipbuilding industry more than the economic situation. is accepted. 
However, the crisis has left its mark on shipyards’ financial statements. The 
disappearance of 230 firms and survival with yields around zero or negative are not minor 
consequences.  However, the costs of survival have not been borne equally, the oldest 
firms “Generation 2006-15” have found it easier to survive, their yields were not large, 
but their equilibrium structure, perhaps better composed than the youngest surviving 
companies (“Generation crisis-15”) has enabled them to survive the crisis less 
traumatically and according to the increased weight of Non-current assets in their balance 
sheets, they are already reinvesting the new profits.  
Thus the oldest companies, with amortised set up costs, better connections, with a 
customer network built up over more years and which benefited from high yields before 
the crisis, are those who experienced fewer changes as a result of the crisis. That does not 
mean they are not making efforts to recapitalise, and improve results, but they are doing 
so more slowly than the youngest companies have had to, thus making them a role model. 
In the light of all this evidence, the present study contributes important information on an 
economic sector that contributes significantly to GDP, employment and Balance of 
Payments equilibrium. These findings may, however, be closely linked to both sample 
and country. Comparison with other equally important industries with similar 
characteristics like the aeronautics industry or railway construction industry, together 
with an extension of the period could provide differentiating and interesting results. As a 
future line of work and to improve the present paper, it would be interesting to compare 
different industries to find out whether the way Spanish shipyards restructured or their 
scanty dependence on the evolution of the economic situation is an inherent characteristic 
of the sector or can be generalised to others. 
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Descriptive statistics  
Generation 2006 -15. Generation 2006 -crisis Generation crisis -2015. Fleeting generation 
2006 Av. S.D. Median Av- S.D. Median Av. S.D. Median Av. S.D. Median 
ROA 0.02 0.18 0.03 -0.04 0.44 0.02 
      
ROE 0.07 0.72 0.08 0.03 1.88 0.10 
      
GR 2.30 4.01 1.47 1.77 2.79 1.18 
      
IN 8.03 37.49 1.73 9.05 25.80 2.34 
      
EE 0.32 0.24 0.27 0.27 0.24 0.19 
      
CR 1.89 3.30 1.26 1.84 3.95 1.09 
      
O3 0.73 4.24 0.28 4.58 43.01 0.36 
      
O2 1.47 1.58 1.19 1.65 2.41 1.10 
      
2009 Av. S.D. Median Av- S.D. Median Av. S.D. Median Av. S.D. Median 
ROA 0.01 0.23 0.02 -0.08 0.43 0.01 -0.09 0.54 0.04 -0.10 0.36 0.00 
ROE 0.07 0.91 0.05 -0.19 4.63 0.07 -0.22 1.80 0.11 -0.20 1.40 -0.01 
GR 3.43 7.89 1.61 3.88 20.37 1.34 1.45 0.89 1.21 1.63 2.34 1.14 
IN 7.66 28.77 1.38 5.49 26.20 1.36 10.2 38.61 1.52 15.59 51.43 2.55 
EE 0.34 0.26 0.28 0.32 0.28 0.23 0.20 0.25 0.18 0.31 0.25 0.23 
CR 2.95 7.30 1.52 2.11 3.92 1.23 1.26 0.72 1.25 1.41 1.79 1.04 
O3 0.89 3.20 0.35 1.93 10.52 0.45 0.29 0.29 0.16 0.91 3.23 0.20 
O2 1.08 1.03 0.85 1.13 1.15 0.95 2.28 2.97 1.04 1.79 1.56 1.70 
2012 Av. S.D. Median Av- S.D. Median Av. S.D. Median Av. S.D. Median 
ROA 0.03 0.25 0.01 -2.03 15.55 0.00 -0.03 0.40 0.01 -0.21 0.74 -0.02 
ROE 1.73 18.80 0.01 -0.09 0.88 0.02 -0.75 4.71 0.17 0.31 1.47 0.31 
GR 2.91 3.17 1.84 9.47 34.77 1.56 2.40 4.39 1.18 3.68 9.77 1.15 
IN 3.00 13.43 1.00 0.64 10.35 0.72 17.57 77.49 1.64 -1.75 21.46 0.21 
EE 0.37 0.26 0.35 0.36 0.30 0.27 0.28 0.26 0.25 0.34 0.30 0.26 
CR 2.76 3.36 1.53 1.55 48.49 1.24 2.35 6.62 1.05 7.98 30.62 1.01 
O3 0.85 3.46 0.41 1.02 2.66 0.39 1.51 5.00 0.23 0.24 0.27 0.11 
O2 0.84 0.81 0.59 1.05 2.50 0.55 3.85 11.43 1.35 1.86 3.04 0.58 
2015 Av. S.D. Median Av- S.D. edian Av. S.D. Median Av. S.D. Median 
ROA 0.01 0.11 0.02 
   
-0.02 0.28 0.01 
   
ROE 0.00 0.43 0.04 
   
0.31 1.22 0.22 
   
GR 2.94 3.33 1.70 
   
1.89 2.83 1.26 
   
IN 2.00 12.65 0.89 
   
2.75 12.57 1.82 
   
EE 0.39 0.28 0.37 
   
0.25 0.26 0.13 
   
CR 3.00 4.45 1.86 
   
3.21 7.90 1.22 
   
O3 0.43 0.47 0.33 
   
0.37 0.27 0.33 
   
O2 0.92 0.88 0.61 
   
1.67 1.36 1.53 
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 F Sig F Sig F Sig F Sig 
ROA 2.2 0.01 2.0 0.03 0.3 0.92 0.7 0.62 
ROE 0.8 0.55 0.8 0.60 2.6 0.01 0.4 0.84 
GR 0.7 0.62 2.7 0.00 1.6 0.12 0.7 0.62 
IN 0.9 0.49 0.9 0.48 1.9 0.07 1.0 0.40 
EE 1.7 0.69 1.6 0.10 0.2 0.97 0.3 0.88 
CR 1.3 0.20 2.0 0.03 1.2 0.26 0.8 0.53 
O3 0.9 0.50 0.6 0.74 1.04 0.39 0.7 0.62 
O2 6.0 0.00 1.3 0.20 0.8 0.55 0.7 0.60 
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